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THE PARTICIPATION OF PARLIAMENT IN THE
ELABORATION AND APPLICATION OF TREATIES
FRAN(gOIS LUCHAIRE*
The French Parliament's participation in the elaboration and en-
forcement of treaties is extremely slight, likewise with respect to their
interpretation and application. The Executive has always tended to con-
sider international relations an area reserved to itself. The Constitution
of October 4th 1958, which the French people accepted on General de
Gaulle's proposal, has accentuated this tendency.
As a result, some of the questions raised in other countries, most
notably the United States, raise few difficulties in France.
Three points as evidence:
In the first place, traditionally, international relations are the privi-
lege of the Executive. The Council of State has sanctified this tradition
by refusing to decide legal suits in which a private individual opposes the
government over issues which concern either the negotiating or conclu-
sion of an international treaty.' The 1958 Constitution emphasized this
by only granting Parliament very limited powers so that Parliament in-
tervenes only when the treaty is concluded and only in order to either
ratify or reject it. There is no parliamentary power to amend a treaty.
In the second place, Parliament has no power to interpret treaties.
For a long time treaty interpretation was also the Executive's privilege.
Today, as a result of the terms of the European Convention to Safeguard
the Rights of Man and Fundamental Liberties 2 and also those of the
United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights3, it is more and
more the responsibility of the judiciary. Here again Parliament cannot
intervene.
In the third place, if a law conflicts with an international treaty, the
French judge has the constitutional obligation to put aside the former
* Conseil Constitutionnel.
This article was translated from the original French text by Micky Forbes, a recent graduate of
the Chicago-Kent College of Law.
1. See, e.g., Decision of March 5, 1926, Conseil d'Etat, 1926 Recueil Sirey, II, No. 96 at 245
(Fr.); Decision of Nov. 7, 1945, Conseil d'Etat, 1945 Recueil des d6cisions du Conseil d'Etat [Lebon]
189; Decision of July 31, 1961, Conseil d'Etat, 1961 Lebon 821; Decision of Oct. 4 1968, Conseil
d'Etat, 1968 Lebon 478; Decision of Nov. 29, 1968, Conseil d'Etat, 1968 Lebon 607.
2. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950,
213 U.N.S.T. 221.
3. Convention on Civil and Political Rights, December 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
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and apply the latter. Parliament cannot, therefore, interfere with the ap-
plication of a treaty. In short, the denunciation of an international con-
vention, insofar as international law allows it, can only come from the
Government.
However, to each of these principles, certain very limited exceptions
apply. All of this, together with parliamentary practice, permits one to
appreciate the exact role of Parliament in the elaboration (and putting
into force), the interpretation and the application of treaties.
I. ELABORATING AND PUTTING A TREATY INTO FORCE.
Article 52 of the Constitution asserts that "the President of the Re-
public negotiates and ratifies treaties."
Indeed, article 53 adds that for the subjects which it enumerates
certain treaties or accords can only be "ratified by virtue of a law."
But, since Parliament does not participate in the elaboration of a
treaty it cannot modify its terms, nor on its own can it attach either
reservations or interpretations. Parliament can only pronounce on the
treaty as a whole. No doubt the government could, at the time of signing
the treaty, attach certain reservations or interpretations, but the Parlia-
ment can only pronounce on the treaty as a whole. No doubt the govern-
ment could, at the time of signing the treaty attach certain reservations
or interpretations to an article, and these reservations might appear in an
annex to the treaty and, therefore, be known to Parliament when it is
attached to the enabling legislation [projet de loi d'autorisation = au-
thorizing government bill]. However, these reservations might also be
incorporated at the time of the ratification and, therefore, after the vote
on the enabling legislation. Parliament thus might not have known of
them, and might also have been unaware of reservations incorporated by
other signatory states.
The rules of the Assembly themselves limit the powers of Parlia-
ment. Senate rules stipulate that, "it does not vote on the articles of the
treaty but only on the government bill which authorizes the ratifica-
tion."'4 National Assembly rules specify that, "it does not vote on the
articles contained in these acts and that it cannot present amendments.' 5
It adds that "the Assembly concludes by the adoption, rejection or post-
ponement of the enabling legislation, postponement may be for cause." '6
4. Reglement de I'Assembl6e nationale [hereinafter Rules of the French National Assembly]
art. 47.
5. Rules of the French National Assembly art. 128.
6. Id. Motions to postpone are unusual, and have never been adopted. Meanwhile, it could
happen that, in order to avoid the adoption of such a motion, where the cause is criticism of the
(V/ol. 67:341
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Some authors think that, even if Parliament cannot amend a treaty,
the Constitution does not expressly forbid amending the law which leads
to its authorization. 7
The French Government is of a different opinion. According to the
Minister of Foreign Affairs, "it is for Parliament only a question in fact
of giving the authorization to the Government and not a question of issu-
ing it any injunctions."" Since this opinion is shared by the President of
the National Assembly9, Edgar Faure, and the President of the Senate 0 ,
Gaston Monnerville, the members of Parliament have not insisted
otherwise. ' I
It is true that the above mentioned rule of the National Assembly,
even more than that of the Senate, forbids such amendments. However,
even though the rules of each Assembly have been declared to conform
to the Constitution by the Constitutional Council, the rules are not of
themselves of Constitutional status.1 2
However, to attach reservations to the authorizing legislation would
once again be for Parliament to issue "injunctions" to the Government,
and the Constitutional Council would not permit that.1 3 It would also be
to grant Parliament the power to intervene in international relations, a
power which the Constitution does not recognize.
The Constitutional Council confirmed the views of the Government
treaty arrangements, the government will prefer to withdraw the enabling legislation from the
agenda.
7. See Alain Pellet, Analyse de Article 53, in COMMENTAIRE DE LA CONSTITUTION DE LA
RtPUBLIQUE FRAN(gAISE 1040 (Frangois Luchaire & Gerard Conac eds., 1980).
8. Rapport du Sinat [hereinafter Senate Report] (June 23, 1977) (Statement of Jean Bernard
Raimond, Minister of Foreign Affairs).
9. Rapport de l'Assembl6e national [hereinafter National Assembly Report] (June 14, 1977)
(Statement of Edgar Faure, President of the National Assembly).
10. Senate Report (June 10, 1963) (Statement of Gaston Monnerville, President of the Senate).
11. On this point see PIERRE AVRIL & JEAN GIRGUEL, DROIT PARLEMENTAIRE 199-200
(1988).
12. See, e.g., Decision of July 27, 1978, Conseil Constitutionnel [hereinafter Con. const.], 1978
Recueil des d6cisions du Conseil Constitutionnel [hereinafter Recueil const.], No. 78-97 at 31 (Ex-
amines changes in criminal procedure for the police judiciary and the jury of assises); Decision of
May 23, 1979, Con. const., 1979 Recueil Con. const., No. 79-104 at 27 (Examines an act regarding
the territory of New Caledonia and Dependencies which modifies the election method of the territo-
rial assembly and the government council; and defines the general rules of technical assistance and
State financial contracts); Decision of Dec. 30, 1982, Con. const., 1982 Recueil Con. const., No. 82-
155 at 88 (The act of rectifying finances of 1982); Decision of July 26, 1984, Con. const., 1984
Recueil Con. const., No. 84-172 at 58 (Law regarding the control system for agricultural exploita-
tion and the tenant farming statute); Decision of Oct. 11, 1984, Con. const., 1984 Recueil Con.
const., No. 84-181 at 78 (Act regarding the newspaper industry: concentration, financial disclosure,
pluralism).
13. See, e.g., Decision of Dec. 28, 1976, Con. const., 1976 Recueil Con. const., No. 76-73 at 41;
Decision of Jan. 17, 1979, Con. const., 1979 Recueil Con. const., No. 78-102 at 26 (Examines an act
approving a statement for the adaptation of the Seventh plan).
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and the Presidents of the Assembly in judging that it was not up to Par-
liament to determine in the authorizing legislation the treaty's range of
application. 14 All the more reason then that Parliament could not ex-
clude from its authorization the ratification of particular articles. It can-
not, therefore, add anything to the enabling legislation which is restricted
to a single article.' 5
The authority to ratify does not carry with it the obligation to pro-
ceed with it. Moreover, it is only the authorizing bill which must be
promulgated within the 15 days which follow its definite adoption16 and
thus be published in the Official Journal. The treaty itself is not pub-
lished yet. Indeed, for that one must wait until the Head of State has first
proceeded with the ratification, which he is free to either do or not. Par-
liament cannot constrain him to proceed within a certain period of time.
There is still a wait for the instruments of ratification to be either ex-
changed or deposited. But, even if the treaty already commits France
with respect to other States, it is not yet challengeable in the French
courts. In order for that it must have been published in the Official Jour-
nal [Journal Officiel]. Publication is determined by the President of the
Republic on the day when he sees fit. Here again Parliament has no
judicial means to force him to either speed up or slow down these formal-
ities of ratification and publication.
Certainly, the National Assembly could make a motion to censure
the Government but it has never done so over the execution or non-exe-
cution of a treaty. Likewise, a member of Parliament could put a ques-
tion, either oral or written, to the Government to which it would be
obliged to respond. However, this is only for Parliament's information
and the Government's response cannot be followed by a vote.
Meanwhile two difficulties present themselves:
A more or less lengthy period of time-and more rather than less-
passes between the signing of the treaty and the Government's handing
down an authorizing bill. Could a member of Parliament not make the
first move by submitting a proposal for a law leading to the
authorization?
The French Government has responded in the negative in the afore-
14. Decision of Jan. 17, 1979, 1979 Recueil Con. const. at 14 "Considering that the territorial
range of application of an international convention is determined either by its stipulations or by the
statutory rules of the international organization under whose auspices it was concluded, the determi-
nation of the range of application thus does not depend on the law which authorizes its ratification."
15. This article is drafted in the following way: "Authorized the ratification of the Treaty ...
signed on ... date . . . the text of which is annexed to the present law."
16. LA CONs-rITUTION art. 10.
[Vol. 67:341344
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mentioned declaration by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of June 23,
1977.17 In this respect one could say that an authorization cannot be
given unless it is asked for. Furthermore, the aforementioned rules for
the National Assembly and the Senate only anticipate "government bills
authorizing ratification," which is to say texts which originate from the
Government, and not proposals, whose texts originate in Parliament."8
All the same, no constitutional requirement limits parliamentary ini-
tiative in this area. The only objection which one can offer is that if
Parliament gave the authorization when the Government did not yet ask
for it, its vote could be construed as an injunction to the Government to
speed up the process. This would be for Parliament, thus, to interfere in
international relations which the Constitution reserves for the Executive.
Again, for a member of Parliament to take the initiative by propos-
ing a law to ratify a treaty, it would be necessary that there be official
communication of its text. The Government would not fail to maintain
its control over the elaboration of the treaty. It is its sole responsibility
to determine the moment when it seems to it necessary that it be publicly
discussed. A premature parliamentary discussion could disturb its inter-
national diplomacy.
The Overseas Territories (New Caledonia, Polynesia, Wallis Islands
and Futuna) raise a difficulty which is reminiscent of those which are
encountered in federal systems.
Does a treaty which commits France apply to them? The Constitu-
tional Council of the French Republic reminds us that it is not up to
Parliament to decide. 19 It is the treaty itself which must specify whether
it does or does not apply in the Overseas Territories. Absent clear indi-
cation in the treaty itself one must attempt to determine the authors'
intentions. The law which authorizes the ratification can thus decide
nothing on this issue.
Now, each Overseas Territory is endowed with a particular organi-
zation which cannot be altered without notice to its Territorial Assem-
bly2°. Furthermore, in both New Caledonia and Polynesia the territorial
organizations have powers, over some subjects, which take over from the
mother country's State organizations (Parliament or Government). The
17. Senate Report, supra note 8 (Jean Bernard Raimond stated "Thus, Parliament does not
have at its disposal the initiative of laws provided for by Article 39 of the Constitution.").
18. Rules of the French National Assembly, supra note 4.
19. Decision Jan. 17, 1989, Con. const., 1989 Recueil Con. const., No. 88-248 at 18, 28-29 (An
act modifying Decision no. 86-1067 of Sept. 30, 1986 regarding freedom of speech).
20. LA CONSTITUTION art. 74.
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laws referring to the particular organization of New Caledonia 21 or of
Polynesia 22 thus stipulate that the Territorial Assembly should be con-
sulted over Government bills which authorize the "ratification of inter-
national conventions dealing with matters within the jurisdiction of
territorial power,"'23 or "within the power of the territory or the Caledo-
nian provinces." '24
These powers of the Territorial Assembly are among the elements of
the particular organization of the territory. As a result 25 a law authoriz-
ing ratification of a treaty, which is applicable in these Territories and
which bears on an issue relevant to the territorial authorities, would be
unconstitutional if it had not been preceded by notice to the Territorial
Assembly concerned.
However, all that is required is notification.26 Parliament can disre-
gard a negative opinion, but if it follows that opinion, it cannot on its
own authority exempt the territory from the application of the treaty.
Parliament can only refuse to ratify the treaty which will lead the Presi-
dent of the Republic to renegotiate.
If Parliament passes the law authorizing the ratification without the
territorial Assembly having been invited to give its opinion then the Con-
stitutional Council will oppose the promulgation of the authorizing law,
which thereby forbids the ratification of the treaty. In this case either the
Government will hand down a new authorization bill after having con-
sulted the Territorial Assembly, or else the President of the Republic will
renegotiate the treaty so as to remove its application to Overseas
Territories.
In sum, one perceives that for both the Mother Country and the
Overseas Territories, Parliament has no more power to participate in the
elaboration of a treaty than to determine its range of application and the
date on which it enters into force. It can only say yes or no to the gov-
ernment bill authorizing the ratification of the treaty without being able
to add a comma or attach the slightest reservation.
One understands, therefore, why the passage of bill authorizing the
21. Referendum of Nov. 9, 1988.
22. Act of Sept. 6, 1984, modified by that of July 14, 1990.
23. Law referring to the particular organization of Polynesia art. 68.
24. Law referring to the particular organization of New Caledonia art. 57.
25. Decision of Jan. 17, 1979, supra note 14.
26. JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RfPUBLIQUE FRANqAISE, Act of Sept. 6, 1984, modified by that
of Sept. 4, 1984 and the referendum of Nov. 9, 1988. Polynesia art. .68; New Caledonia art. 57.
Notice must be given within a certain period "in principle one month, and in 15 days in emergencies
declared by the representative of the French Government" (New Caledonia). In Polynesia these
notifications are shifted to 3 months and I month respectively. Past these times "notice is considered
to have been given."
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ratification of a treaty seems to be a simple formality to which Parlia-
ment devotes little time.
It is appropriate in this limited context to list the grounds upon
which ratification of a treaty requires authorizing legislation.




" Treaties referring to international organization,
* Treaties which commit the state's finances,
* Treaties referring to the condition of people,
" Treaties which include ceding, exchanging or adding territory,
" and in a more general way treaties which "alter arrangements of a
legislative type."
This last category raises a difficulty. In effect the Constitution in
Articles 34 and 37 enumerates the matters reserved to legislation, while
other subjects may be regulated by governmental decree. The drafters of
the Constitution had thus thought that by "arrangements of a legislative
type" one should understand those which bear on the subjects reserved to
legislation. One could, therefore, believe that there was no reason to stop
at the verb "alter" and that treaties should be submitted to Parliament
which bear on those subjects even on points which have not yet been
legislated. This interpretation has logic on its side: Parliament having
sole competence to legislate in these areas it ought to be obligatory that it
be apprized of all treaties bearing on these same areas.
However, the Constitutional Council, since its decision of July 30
1982,27 is of the opinion that a law which intervenes in an area not re-
served to legislation is not for that reason in conflict with the Constitu-
tion. The law can simply be declared obsolete [declassee] by the
Constitutional Council, by applying Article 37, paragraph 2 of the Con-
stitution, thereby allowing the Government to alter it by decree. Thus, it
seems in this way that as long as a law has not been declared obsolete by
the Constitutional Council, a treaty which alters its disposition cannot be
ratified without Parliament's authorization.
Finally, it is generally agreed that what justifies Parliament's power
is either the existence of a disposition by an earlier law, or it is the subject
on which the international engagement bears, and not the form of the
27. Decision of July 30, 1982, Con. const., 1982 Recueil Con. const., No. 82-143 at 57, 59
(Decision about prices and revenues).
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latter. In this respect, Article 53 of the Constitution treats the treaty
submitted for ratification the same way as it treats an accord not submit-
ted for ratification through simple approval of the Executive. The so-
called accords thus enter in simplified form into the range of Article 53's
application when it bears on these subjects, or alters the above-mentioned
dispositions.
The Constitutional Council, in a decision on December 30, 1975,28
had to settle a difficulty concerning technical agreements with respect to
finance. It decided in effect that these agreements29 could dispense with
legislative authorization in the case where Parliament had already passed
a global funding of credit which ensured their performance.
This decision was much criticized however. In the area of financial
procedure it was understandable because the Government is acting
within the credit limits passed by Parliament. However, in the field of
international relations it reduces Parliament's power once more because
it could not vote on any of these technical agreements, even though in
fact financial aid granted to a foreign country (in this case Chile) com-
mits not only France's finances but also its international diplomacy.
II. TREATY INTERPRETATION
A Parliament which can only decide on a treaty with a yes or a no
obviously cannot impose any interpretation upon it. Meanwhile, after
the ratification (which it authorized) could it enact a law which would
interpret its arrangements?
The question has never been put since the 1958 Constitution.
In fact treaty interpretation complies with other rules. For a long
time there was a tradition in France: whenever a judge was confronted
with a problem of interpretation of an international agreement he asked
the Minister of Foreign Affairs to give him the official interpretation of
the French Government. Then he would apply it. Treaty interpretation
thus depended either on the judge when he felt no doubt about the mean-
ing of the agreement, or on the Government when the judge had serious
doubts.
Today however this practice has fallen into disuse for a very simple
reason. It conflicts with the agreements of both the European Council
and the United Nations concerning the Rights of Man. The Council of
28. Decision of Dec. 30, 1975, Con. const., 1975 Recueil Con. const., No. 75-60 at 28 (Ex-
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State renounced the practice in its decision of June 29, 199030 and itself
interprets treaties.
In fact interpreting the law, like a contract or an international agree-
ment, is the normal fare of a judge. Now the Convention to Safeguard
the Rights of Man and Fundamental Freedoms31 asserts in article 6: "In
the determination of his civil rights and obligation or of a criminal
charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing
within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal estab-
lished by law."'32
To the extent that the dispute involves the interpretation of a treaty
neither the Minister of Foreign Affairs nor even the Parliament can be
considered an "independent and impartial tribunal. ' 33
Therefore, the interpretation can only be made by the judge. Within
the setting of the European Economic Community, and several other
conventions concluded between its twelve members, this principle is en-
shrined in a procedure which standardizes the interpretation of Commu-
nity texts throughout the entire territory of the Community. Indeed,
according to Article 177 of the Treaty of Rome, when a jurisdiction rul-
ing without possibility of appeal encounters a difficulty in interpreting
Community law it must ask the European Court of Justice to rule on this
question. 34 It is then bound by the decision of the Court.
Suppose, meanwhile, that a law subsequent to the entry into force of
the treaty should interpret its arrangements.3 5 If it were the Treaty of
Rome this law would have no effect because-as we will see below-the
judge applies the treaty even if there is a law which conflicts with it. The
judge would thus be led to ask the European Court of Justice its interpre-
tation by application of Article 177 of the Treaty of Rome.
If it involved an international agreement other than those of the Eu-
ropean Community the answer to this question would be more compli-
cated. In fact, either the interpretive law seems to the judge to conflict
with the treaty and so he applies the treaty and not the law, or the inter-
pretation does not conflict with the treaty and the judge considers it a
step facilitating the execution of the treaty by specifying its meaning and
he will consequently apply it. However, naturally this strictly French
30. Decision of June 29, 1990, Conseil d'Etat, 1990 Lebon 171.
31. Supra note 2.
32. Supra note 2, art. 6, at 228.
33. Id.
34. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, art. 177, 298
U.N.T.S. 11, 76-77. (If it is not ruling without possibility of appeal, it may refer it to the Court of
Justice.).
35. This is a merely academic exercise since it has never happened.
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interpretation has no force in the international order and thus does not
apply to other countries. According to the well-known rule, a country's
domestic law is for other countries and for international jurisdictions
merely a fact and not an obligation.
Finally, it often happens that in responding to parliamentary ques-
tions the Government makes known its interpretation of such and such a
treaty already in force. This gives Parliament useful information but this
interpretation does not bind the judge at all. The Council of State has in
effect decided that in no case do governmental responses to parliamen-
tary questions constitute a legal rule which an individual could invoke at
law.36
By contrast, the interpretation which the Government can be lead to
provide at the time of the parliamentary debate on the law authorizing
ratification can give the judge an important clue about the intentions of
this treaty's authors. Thus, in this way, this interpretation can weigh in
the decision of the judge who, when he asks himself about the meaning of
a term in the treaty, intends to refer to the intentions of its authors. This
is, therefore, a way (rather indirect and of limited effect) for Parliament
to get an interpretation of the treaty which suits it.
III. TREATY APPLICATION
Can Parliament object to the application of a properly ratified and
published treaty?
The answer is a resounding no.
Article 55 of the Constitution reads: "treaties or accords properly
ratified or approved have, from the moment of their publication, a supe-
rior force to legislation (for each treaty or accord), subject to its applica-
tion by the other party."
The Constitutional Council has on several occasions recalled this
primacy of treaties over legislation. Notably, it criticized a legislative
arrangement which restricted the extent of this primacy. a7 Moreover, it
has considered that this extends to derived law, that is to say to the rules
established by international bodies in compliance with the treaties that
established them.3 8
36. Decision of Nov. 2, 1955, Conseil d'Etat, 1955 Lebon 515.
37. Decision of Sept. 3, 1986, Con. const., 1986 Con. const., No. 86-216 at 135 (Act regarding
the conditions of entry and visitation of foreigners in France).
38. See, e.g., Decision of Apr. 29, 1978, Con. const., 1978 Recueil Con. const., No. 78-93 at 23
(Examines the act which authorizes an increase of the French quota for the International Monetary
Fund); Decision of Dec. 30, 1977, Con. const., 1977 Recueil Con. const., No. 77-89 at 46 (Examines
the Financial Act of 1978 and, notably, articles 1 and 38, as well as state appendix A.).
[Vol. 67:341
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For the Constitutional Council control over the conformity of law
with treaties is different from control of the conformity of law with the
Constitution. This is why the Council only proceeds against the latter
and not the former.3 9 However, it invites other jurisdictions to apply the
treaties (decision of September 3, 1986) 40 and thus to set aside laws
which conflict with them. The Supreme Court of Appeal (decree of May
24, 1975)41 and more recently the Council of State (decision of October
20, 1989)42 have accepted this invitation and were thus led to apply the
treaty despite a conflicting law whether it be prior or subsequent to the
treaty. The Constitutional Council does the same thing when it rules on
the regularity of an election, because in this case it is, like all other juris-
dictions, judging legality and not constitutionality.
To these rules it is proper to apply an exception because the above
mentioned Article 55 of the Constitution asserts that the superiority of
treaties over laws -is "for each treaty or accord, subject to its application
by the other party."
Consequently, if a country which has co-signed a treaty with France
does not apply the treaty then Parliament can pass a law which conflicts
with it. This is the application of the old adage, the exception does not
fulfill the contract (exceptio non adempleti contractus). But, such a law
is only conceivable to the extent that this exception is admissible. We
know, following the Vienna Convention, that with respect to the applica-
tion of the Human Rights Conventions it is not admissible because these
afford as much protection to the nationals of a signing party as to its
partners.
One should also consider that an exception can only apply to bilat-
eral treaties or legal treaties. For example, the fact that a state does not
apply a convention concerning patents does not allow other signatory
states to excuse themselves from applying it.
In this respect, especially within the European Community, the ex-
ception for non-reciprocity cannot be invoked. In effect the Court of Jus-
39. See Decision of Jan. 15, 1975, Con. const., 1975 Recueil Con. const., No. 74-54 at 19 (Ex-
amines the act regarding abortion); Decision of July 20, 1977, Con. const., 1977 Recueil Con. const.,
No. 77-83 at 39 (Examines the act modifying article 4 of the financial amendment act of 1961 con-
cerning the obligation of service of civil servants); Decision of July 27, 1978, Con. const., 1978 Con.
const., No. 78-96 at 29 (Examines the completing act of August 7, 1974 regarding radio and televi-
sion broadcasting).
40. See Decision of Sept. 3, 1986, Con. const., 1986 Recuiel Con. const., 31 [hereinafter Deci-
sion of Sept. 3, 1986].
41. Decision of May 24, 1975, Cours d'appel, 1975 Recueil Dalloz-Sirey, Jurisprudence, 497.
42. Decision of Oct. 20, 1989, Conseil d'Etat, 1989 Lebon 190.
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tice, whose role in standardizing the interpretation of Community law we
have already seen, has the power to compel the execution of this law.
The power of the Executive resurfaces with respect to the non-appli-
cation of a bilateral treaty to which France is committed by a foreign
country. Indeed, the internal/domestic judge is not well placed to deter-
mine whether a foreign country is or is not applying a treaty. In these
circumstances the Council of State suspends ruling until the Foreign
Minister has made it known whether the country involved in the case is
applying the treaty or not. The judge then derives from the Foreign Min-
ister's reply the consequences he considers necessary.
Can this finding that a foreign country is not applying a treaty be
made by Parliament?
Certainly not! It would in effect be interference by the Assembly in
international relations. All that Parliament could do is pass a law con-
trary to the treaty which the judge would apply or not depending on the
answer the Foreign Minister gives to the preceding question.
Parliament's lack of competence to oppose the execution of a treaty
should be tempered by two considerations.
In the first place, even though a judge has the possibility and even
the obligation to set aside the law, he does not like to do so. Largely
using his powers of textual interpretation the judge tries as much as pos-
sible to give the law a meaning which makes it compatible with the
treaty.
In the second place, when it comes time for Parliament to vote on
the budget it can always refuse the funding necessary to execute the
treaty. However, this possibility is limited within the context of the Eu-
ropean Community by the Constitutional Council's above-mentioned de-
cision of December 30, 1975.43 It effectively decided that Community
rules "are obligatory in all their elements and are directly applicable in
the member states," 44 and consequently when these rules determine the
base and the rate of fees imposed on certain businesses it is no longer up
to Parliament to make the determination. This is, however, a situation
peculiar to the European Community.
Meanwhile, one can ask what the Constitutional Council would do
if faced with a law cutting off the funding necessary for the execution of a
treaty. It is understood that it is unnecessary to resist a law which con-
flicts with a treaty because the judge will not apply such a law. The
situation is obviously different in the case of a refusal of funding essential
43. Decision of Dec. 30, 1975, supra note 28, at 46.
44. Decision of Dec. 30, 1975, supra note 28.
[Vol. 67:341
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for France's international commitments. The Constitutional Council is
critical of laws which create the defect of a "negative incompetence",
which is to say do not include the "legal guarantees for needs of a consti-
tutional character. '45 To the extent that, "it belongs to the various or-
gans of government to oversee the application of these international
agreements within their respective competence," 46 a law which denies the
funding necessary for this application may appear contrary to the
Constitution.
The denunciation of a treaty is also not dependent on the powers of
Parliament.
Its lack of competence in this regard is even greater than in the elab-
oration of a treaty.
In fact, when denunciation is not forbidden, or limited for the time
being, by the treaty itself, denunciation can be freely accomplished by the
Executive without having to ask for authorization from Parliament.
Thus, Parliament which is competent to authorize the ratification of cer-
tain treaties is not to intervene in order to authorize their denunciation.
This is a novelty introduced by the Constitution of 1958, because the
previous Constitution-of 1946-required this authorization except for
the denunciation of trade treaties.47
Doctrine explains this lack of parliamentary power by the fact that
since 1958 it has only had allocated powers. However, it is most certain
that the authors of the Constitution of 1958 were aware of the effects of
their silence concerning the denunciation of trade treaties.48
IV. THE ROLE OF PARLIAMENT.
What then can Parliament do in the sphere of international
relations?
What remains are all the techniques of the parliamentary system to
which are added certain practices which depend, however, on the good
will of the Government.
Members of Parliament can:
45. See Decision of July 29, 1986, Con. const., 1986 Recueil Con. const., No. 86-210 at 110;
Decision of Sept. 18, 1986, Con. const., 1986 Recueil Con. const., No. 86-217 at 141.
46. Decision of Sept. 3, 1986, supra note 40.
47. It is true that under the 3d Republic (Constitution of 1875) the government was in practice
acknowledged to have the discretionary power to denounce treaties.
48. Indeed General de Gaulle's representative declared that if trade treaties were included
among treaties which require authorization for ratification, then it must be specified that the govern-
ment is free to denounce these trade treaties. Afterwards silence was kept about denunciation. On
this point see the discussion before the Constitutional Council, Documentation Francaise, 2 Docu-
MENTS TO ASSIST IN THE HISTORY OF THE ELABORATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF 1958, at 132.
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" introduce a proposal for a law authorizing the Government to ratify a
treaty which the Government is tardy in submitting. Even though, as
has been mentioned, the Government does not acknowledge that they
have this power;
• ask all useful questions, but only for Parliament's information, con-
cerning international relations;
" "audition" the government via the commissions responsible for for-
eign affairs;
" introduce (only in the National Assembly) a motion of censure criti-
cizing the Government's foreign policy and obliging the Government
to resign. That is obviously, if the censure passes.
The Government may seek-and often does seek-to associate Par-
liament in its foreign policy. In this regard several recent practices
should be noted.
In the first place the Government has adopted the habit of commu-
nicating to the Foreign Affairs Commissions of both Houses the list of
treaties or agreements that France has concluded. A commission can ask
for the texts, and not only is this communication useful for Parliament's
information, but it also allows members of Parliament to check whether
these treaties should be submitted to Parliament, and may apply pressure
on the Government because the commissions put the treaties to the As-
semblies, or even introduce proposals for authorizing legislation.
In the second place, the parliamentary left, when it was in opposi-
tion always protested when the Government did not communicate the
reservations which it proposed to attach to the ratification. Once in
power the left has nearly always made known to Parliament these
reservations.
Thirdly, at the time of the debates over the authorizing legislation,
members of Parliament can "advise" the Government to attach certain
specific reservations to the ratification. The Government will take note
of this "advice" either for political advantage, or simply because the res-
ervation are clearly justified. Thus it happens that at the time of the
debate the Government undertakes to formulate the reservations pro-
posed by members of Parliament.
Fourthly, when the Government has to take a particularly serious
decision it may wish to "soften" Parliament by associating it in its deci-
sion taking. This was the case, for example, with the France-Germany
Treaty of January 22, 1963 which bore on none of the issues enumerated
in Article 53 of the Constitution. For the same reason the Government
wanted a vote in both Houses on January 16, 1991 at the time of its
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decision to participate in the military operations to liberate Kuwait. Cer-
tainly, Article 35 of the Constitution stipulates that "declaration of war
is authorized by Parliament." France however, never considered itself
legally [juridically] at war with Iraq, it was participating in an interna-
tional police operation authorized by the United Nations Security Coun-
cil. The President of the Republic, Commander-in-chief of the armies,49
has no need for authorization from Parliament to give them orders to
intervene.
Nonetheless, in order to get Parliament's agreement, the Govern-
ment used Article 49 of the Constitution. By virtue of the lead para-
graph of this article it committed its responsibility before the National
assembly with a "declaration of general policy." By virtue of the last
paragraph of the same article it asked the Senate to approve a declaration
of general policy.
However, none of the procedures which have just been cited in this
section are required of the Government, and they do not constitute bind-
ing precedent. The French Constitution is written, and no rule resulting
from custom can bind the power of the Executive.
A recent and particularly interesting example of Parliament's inter-
vention in the elaboration of an international convention can be given by
what is know as the Schengen accord.50
On June 14, 1985 government representatives of certain member
states of the European Community (France, Belgium, Netherlands, Ger-
many, Luxembourg) signed agreements at Schengen, a small town in
Luxembourg, leading to the gradual suppression of border controls at
their common frontiers. 51 This very discreet agreement was not submit-
ted to the French Parliament since it only defined goals and enacted no
positive regulations. After four years of discussion, on June 19, 1990, in
the same town, the same governments signed a document entitled "Con-
vention d'application de l'accord de Schengen. ' 52 Subsequently, they
signed an agreement with Italy which granted it adhesion to the afore-
mentioned convention. Both this and the adhesion accord became the
object of two government bills authorizing their ratification.
The Council of State, when asked for an opinion as required by arti-
49. LA CONsrrUTION art. 15.
50. Schengen Agreement on the Gradual Abolition of Checks at Common Borders, June 14,
1985, 30 I.L.M. 68 (1991).
51. Id.
52. Convention Applying -the Schengen Agreement on the Gradual Abolition of Checks at
Common Borders, June 19, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 68 (1991).
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cle 39 of the Constitution, gave a favorable opinion on May 23, 1991.53
However, in so doing it gave a very specific interpretation-which was
confirmed by the Government--of one of the Convention's arrange-
ments. One which in effect instituted an "Executive committee" en-
dowed with normative powers. The Council of State affirmed that the
decisions of this committee could not have direct effect on the territories
of the contracting parties without violating the French Constitution. 54
At the National Assembly the accord generated a certain amount of
feeling in the ranks of the opposition. Did the abolition of border control
at the frontiers separating France from the other countries of the Euro-
pean Community not risk facilitating both drug traffic and illegal immi-
gration? What would become of Customs' personnel and of the Air and
Frontier Police? How would Parliament be informed of the application
of the Convention?
The opposition demanded a solemn declaration from the Govern-
ment on all these points, to be added to what it would say before the
Assembly. The Prime Minister, Edith Cresson, believed that she was
satisfying the demand by addressing a fairly detailed response to Mr.
Charles Millon, President of the U.D.F. Party in the National Assembly
on June 8, 1991. 5 However, while the latter would have liked to install a
"French parliamentary observer of Schengen," the Prime Minister
thought it simpler to "let the national representatives determine the most
appropriate terms and conditions within the framework of existing pro-
cedure." In the Senate, the reporter, Mr. Paul Masson, thinks that the
negotiations at Schengen have been conducted in such a discreet fashion
"that Parliament was presented with a fait accompli and that it would,
therefore, be difficult to decide with any degree of calm."'5 6 Examining
the Constitutional problem he declared that the powers conferred on the
Executive Committee of the Schengen Accord were contrary to the Con-
stitution. Finally, he got the Senate to create a Control Commission, of
which he is today the president, which is charged with tracking the exe-
cution of the Schengen agreements.
However, the creation of this commission is as a sword striking
water, since in fact, like all inquiry commissions the Control Commission
cannot function for more that six months. It must, therefore, finish its
53. The judgment has not been published but was discussed in parliamentary debates.
54. Id.
55. Letter from Edith Cresson, Prime Minister of France, to Charles Millon, President of the
U.D.F. Party (June 8, 1991) (unpublished in author's files).
56. Parliamentary debates.
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work in December 1991, even though the Schengen accords will not have
begun to apply by that date.
The law authorizing the approval of these accords was submitted to
the Constitutional Council by 64 deputies who reproached them for vio-
lating French sovereignty. Curiously enough they did not resort to ques-
tioning the constitutionality of the Executive Committee provided for by
the accords. However, the Council automatically raised this grievance
only to reject it by giving what one calls a "neutralizing interpretation"
of the arrangement in question. 57 Like the Council of State they in effect
judged that no stipulation of the Convention gave this committee's deci-
sions a direct effect, and that "the measures taken by the French authori-
ties, following any decisions of said committee, would themselves be
under the control of French jurisdiction."58
This decision of the Council prompts several observations:
In the first place, this is the first time that the Council officially
raised a grievance in order to reject it. Until now it had only officially
raised grievances which it sustained. This departure is useful because it
allows it to give a neutralizing interpretation to a questionable
arrangement.
In the second place, if the Constitutional Council proceeded in this
way, it is because it was alerted not only by the opinion of the Council of
State, but also by the parliamentary debates and notably by the interven-
tion of Senator Paul Masson. One sees in this way that parliamentary
debate can have an influence, although not directly on a treaty whose
approval is submitted for parliament's authorization, but on the interpre-
tation which the Constitutional Council is led to give it.
In the third place, is the Constitutional Council's interpretation es-
sential? In the international order certainly not. Senator Paul Masson
feared as much and with reason since an interpretation by a French juris-
diction, even of the level of the Constitutional Council, is not binding on
judges from other countries.
Does it bind a French judge? Certainly, according to Article 61 of
the Constitution the decisions of the Constitutional Council are binding
on all authorities both administrative and judicial, but what does its deci-
sion mean? That an interpretation other than its own will render the
treaty contrary to the Constitution. However, a judge--other than the
Constitutional Council-is not the judge of the constitutionality of legis-
57. Decision of June 23, 1991, Con. const. no. 91-293; reprinted in Frangois Luchaire, Com-
mentaire d la Ddcision de Juin 23, 1991, 1991 REVUE DE DROIT PUBLIC 1514.
58. Id.
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lation, even less of international conventions. One cannot, therefore, dis-
card an international convention on the pretext that it is interpreted in a
manner contrary to the Constitution. In contrast, one can argue that, in
the decision of the Constitutional Council, what binds the judge is not
only the unconstitutionality of a particular interpretation, but the con-
forming interpretation itself. This is as much true as that a text should
be interpreted in the manner most suited to the subject matter59 since it is
obvious that the interpretation which renders a text consistent with the
Constitution is the one which is most suited to the subject matter.
One ascertains in this manner that even if members of Parliament
cannot impose on an international convention the interpretation of their
choice, they can, very indirectly, get from the Constitutional Council the
interpretation which is consistent with the Constitution. For want of
either reservations or interpretation based on opportunity there remains
to them the constitutional route.
The powers of the French Parliament seem very weak in compari-
son to those of the United States Senate. If the latter disposes of perhaps
too much, the former seem to be wanting.
This double result comes from failure to adapt the competence of
institutions to the evolution of society and relations between nations.
The United States Senate received power over the subject of international
treaties, not so much as a legislative Assembly, but as assistant, in the
name of the federation of States, to the President of the United States.
At issue were treaties which concerned individuals only very indirectly.
Today many treaties which are submitted to it bear on issues which are
the object of legislation and which thus concern the lives of private indi-
viduals. Consequently, it would be much more normal that their ap-
proval be the work of Congress ruling according to its normal procedure.
As to the French Parliament it is witnessing the progressive erosion
of its legislative competence first, as a result of the expansion of Commu-
nity legislation, and then, as a result of the increase in multilateral
conventions.
Does the slight role of Parliament in the elaboration, interpretation
and execution of treaties fit with the requirements of democracy.
Many doubt it.
A distinction could be made between treaties: some of them con-
cern State to State relations, which one conceives to be an area reserved
to the Executive, and where Parliament, having simply the power of
59. CODE CIVIL art. 1158.
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political control, complies with the principles of the parliamentary sys-
tem. However, other treaties contain laws, in the material sense of the
word. These treaties will replace domestic law, it would, therefore, be
more normal for the Legislature to contribute to their elaboration.
The Constitution of 1958 makes no such distinction.
For General de Gaulle who wanted this Constitution, if not in its
details at least in its fundamental principles, Parliament's role in interna-
tional affairs could never be more than secondary. His successors have
made a very good adjustment to it, including President Mitterrand who
did not approve of the Constitution. Today, however, he feels that Par-
liament is too stifled!

